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Mandatory Disclosure in the Market 
for Union Representation 
Matthew T. Bodie 
As we celebrate (and fret over) the seventy-fifth anniversary of the   
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),1 I want to focus on one of the more 
famous doctrines of the Act’s rich history.  In General Shoe Corp.,2 the   
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) established what is 
known as the “laboratory conditions” doctrine.  Using a memorable turn of 
phrase, the Board stated: “In election proceedings, it is the Board’s function 
to provide a laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted, under 
conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires 
of the employees.”3  The image of a laboratory being used to determine 
“uninhibited desires” has always been wonderfully incongruous to me.  But 
the metaphor has lasted.  Over one thousand Board and federal court deci-
                                                                                                                           
  Matthew T. Bodie is Associate Professor and Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Devel-
opment at Saint Louis University School of Law.  Professor Bodie would like to thank the Florida Inter-
national University College of Law, Dean Alex Acosta, Professor Kerri Stone, and FIU Law Review for 
the opportunity to participate in this terrific symposium.  Professor Bodie is also grateful to Harold A. 
Maier, Resident Officer of the Board’s Miami office, for his commentary on the paper. 
 1 Brooding over the current state of labor law has become a cherished part of NLRA anniversary 
celebrations.  See, e.g., Benjamin Aaron, The NLRB, Labor Courts, and Industrial Tribunals: A Selective 
Comparison, 39 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 35, 45 (1985) (“It must be admitted that after 50 years, the 
Board still has not succeeded in providing adequate protection of the right to organize and to bargain 
collectively, in developing effective remedies against unfair labor practices, or in substantially reducing 
its ever-rising backlog of cases.”); James J. Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and the Law of the 
Workplace, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1563, 1563 (1996) (“Sixty years after the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA) was passed, collective action appears moribund.”); David L. Gregory & Raymond T. 
Mak, Significant Decisions of the  NLRB, 1984: The Reagan Board’s ‘Celebration’ of 
the Fiftieth Anniversary of the NLRA, 18 CONN. L. REV. 7, 8-9 (1985) (“Although neither the Board, the 
Act, nor labor law is irreversibly in extremis at this half-century crossroads, troublesome indicia 
are present.”).  The title of this conference calls to mind one of the more famous of these reflections:  
Michael H. Gottesman, Wither Goest Labor Law: Law and Economics in the Workplace, 100 YALE L.J. 
2767 (1991) (“The long and steady decline in the percentage of private-sector employees represented by 
unions – a decline now in its fourth decade – preoccupies all thinking about American labor law to-
day.”). 
 2 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948). 
 3 Id. at 127. 
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sions refer to the “laboratory conditions” doctrine,4 and it is still the touch-
stone for determining whether the results of a representation election are 
enforced.  Under this doctrine, the Board may order that an election be   
vacated and conducted anew if the winning party violated the laboratory 
conditions through its pre-election conduct. 
The laboratory conditions doctrine suggests an active and vigorous 
role for the Board in providing employees with the proper election envi-
ronment.  After all, it seems like a fairly arduous task to provide an experi-
mental laboratory with “conditions as nearly ideal as possible.”  And     
indeed, the Board has an extensive list of prohibited conduct: threatening 
speech, interrogations, polling, surveillance, promises of improved condi-
tions, grants of benefits, and inflammatory appeals.5  However, the Board 
has been largely reactive in its regulation, keeping out certain sources of 
election impurities but doing little to assist employees in their decision.   
There is reason to doubt that employees are getting the information they 
need when making their representation decision.6  At present, the Board 
does little to ensure that such information is available.7  It would be well 
within the Board’s current role as election regulator to make sure that     
employees have easy access to the information they need. 
In this symposium contribution, I examine how the Board could use a 
mandatory disclosure regime to provide information to employees when 
making their representation decision.  In Part I, I discuss the information 
already disclosed through the NLRA as well as the Labor-Management 
Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA or Landrum-Griffin Act) and fed-
eral securities laws.  In Part II, I discuss how the Board could pair this    
information with a limited scheme of information disclosure to provide a 
                                                                                                                           
 4 A Westlaw search on May 21, 2010 for laboratory conditions within the same sentence as 
election (“laboratory conditions” /s election) returned 788 results in the FLB-NLRB database and 260 
results in the ALLFEDS database. 
 5 See MICHAEL C. HARPER ET AL., LABOR LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 317-62 (6th 
ed. 2007) (providing an overview of campaign regulation). 
 6 Matthew T. Bodie, Information and the Market for Union Representation, 94 VA. L. REV. 1, 4, 
45-69 (2008); see also Catherine L. Fisk, Thoughts on Treating Union Representation Processes as a 
Market in Need of Legally Required Disclosure of Information, 94 VA. L. REV. 1, 7 (2008) (discussing 
“the substantial information problems that already exist in the [election] process”); Jeffrey M. Hirsch, 
Rent-to-Own Unionism?, 94 VA. L. REV.  9, 9 (2008) (discussing the “information deficiencies         
implicated by union elections”); Harry G. Hutchison, The Market for Union Representation: An Infor-
mation Deficit or Rational Behavior?, 94 VA. L. REV. 15, 16 (2008) (discussing how information “may 
help workers make a free and reasoned choice”); Anne Marie Lofaso, Toward a Foundational Theory of 
Workers’ Rights: The Autonomous Dignified Worker, 76 UMKC L. REV. 1, 41 (2007) (arguing that 
workers must “have access to relevant firm-specific information” in order to be autonomous). 
 7 Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Communication Breakdown: Reviving the Role of Discourse in the Regula-
tion of Employee Collective Action, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV., Working Paper at 2 (forthcoming 2011) 
(noting that the value of employee communication to the representation process is “badly undervalued”). 
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base level of election-related information to employees.  I conclude with 
thoughts on the way forward. 
I.  DISCLOSURE UNDER CURRENT LAW 
A. Disclosure under the NLRA 
At present, the Board places no disclosure requirements on unions or 
employers in the context of a union representation campaign.  In fact, it has 
held that even extreme circumstances do not require parties to disclose.  In 
Florida Mining & Materials Corp., the only case to examine this issue at 
length, the petitioning union – a Teamsters local – had been placed into 
receivership by the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) the day 
before the representation election.8  Evidence gathered after the fact, 
through internal union documents as well as press coverage, indicated that 
the takeover was triggered by “an irreconcilable conflict between the top 
union officers which rendered the local unable to function.”9  Further, the 
IBT’s letter announcing the takeover stated that: “Unless immediate action 
is taken, it cannot be assured that the Local Union will be able to fulfill its 
duties as bargaining representative or to carry out the other legitimate    
objects of a labor organization.”10  As a result of the takeover, all officers 
and business agents of the local were replaced.  In a newspaper interview 
after the takeover, the IBT-appointed trustee reported that “financial mis-
management” had left the local $18,000 in debt, and he “expressed doubt 
about the continued existence of the local.”11  However, the article also   
described picketing at the union headquarters by union members who were 
“greatly disturbed by both the imposition of the trusteeship and the firing of 
officers and agents.”12 
The employer objected to the election under the laboratory conditions 
doctrine based on the union’s failure to disclose this information.  The   
employer alleged that this receivership signified the local’s precarious   
financial status, and that as a result the local would be unqualified to 
properly represent the bargaining unit.13  The Board affirmed the regional 
director’s decision overruling the employer’s objections,14 and the Fifth 
                                                                                                                           
 8 Fla. Mining & Materials Corp., 198 N.L.R.B. 601, 601 (1972), enforced, 481 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 
1973). 
 9 Fla. Mining & Materials Corp. v. NLRB, 481 F.2d 65, 66 (5th Cir. 1973). 
 10 Id.   
 11 Id. at 66-67. 
 12 Id. at 67. 
 13 Fla. Mining, 198 N.L.R.B. at 601-02. 
 14 The Regional Director’s opinion and Board order affirming that opinion were not published.  
The Board did publish its summary enforcement of the § 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain.  Id. at 603-04. 
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Circuit enforced the order to bargain.15  Noting that an affirmative disclo-
sure rule “has never been formulated or imposed in any reported case,” the 
Board argued to the court that such a rule would not make sense.16          
Although it found the case to present an extremely close question, the Fifth 
Circuit found that the Board had not abused its discretion, noting that the 
unusual proximity between the takeover and the election likely rendered 
this situation “a unique problem.”17 
The Board’s arguments against disclosure in Florida Mining follow a 
familiar set of concerns with any disclosure regime.  First, the Board con-
tended that setting up such a regime would entail “great difficulty in deter-
mining the scope and extent of an affirmative disclosure rule.”18  Once the 
regime was established, moreover, “losing parties would be quick to take 
advantage of any such rule in an effort to avoid the consequences of a free 
election.”19  Second, the Board fell back on its “neutral umpire” role:  
Under the campaign processes as they now exist, the competing argu-
ments pro and con on unionization are left to be presented by the    
parties.  The employer, because of supposed financial and entrepre-
neurial disadvantages flowing from unionization, is assigned the role 
of bringing the alleged negative aspects of unionization to the atten-
tion of the electorate.  Likewise, the union is to stress its advantages.  
The Board, as referee, steps in only in the case of low blows, and 
even then only when the injured party does not have sufficient time to 
present a response.20 
Essentially, the Board disclaims any duty to provide employees with 
the information they need to make a decision; this role is left to the parties.   
                                                                                                                           
 15 Fla. Mining, 481 F.2d at 65. 
 16 Id. at 67. 
 17 Id. at 69.  In explaining its decision, the court stated: 
It appears to the court that employees should have the right to know prior to voting for a union that 
at least for a short time actual control of the day to day administration of the local was to be      
handled by a representative of the International, not by those people whom the employees had un-
derstood to be the heads of the local. On the other hand, we fully recognize the administrative dif-
ficulties which would follow from a rule designed to cover this case. Furthermore, we agree that 
recalcitrant employers would take advantage of the situation and file meaningless challenges in an 
effort to further delay implementation of the desires of the employees. Since ours is not a duty to 
resolve these intricate competing interests but only to review the initial decision of the administra-
tive body, we do not feel we have to analyze and balance these competing factors in detail. 
Id. at 70. 
 18 Id. at 67. 
 19 Id.   
 20 Id. at 67-68. 
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Third, even if the Board were to supply the information relevant to the 
election, it would be unsure of what this information would be.21  According 
to the Fifth Circuit, “[t]he Board actually admits that in all likelihood the 
voter’s choice is ‘too often inescapably non-rational.’”22  The court was left 
to suss out the ramifications of this view: “the Board seems to be saying 
that specific information is rarely, if ever, important to an employee faced 
with a unionization vote.”23  Fourth and finally, the Board argued that the 
information in this particular case – the trusteeship – was not all that rele-
vant to the representation decision.  The Board framed the issue as one of 
internal union governance, and argued that “studies of employee non-
participation amply illustrate that democratic participation in union affairs 
is not an important concern of voters.”24 
In my view, none of these arguments is persuasive.  Yes, administra-
tive costs could be daunting, but it all depends on how the disclosure     
requirement is framed.  The Board could require disclosure and still remain 
a “neutral umpire,” in the same way agencies such as the EPA, the FDA, 
and the SEC face similar requirements.  But more importantly, according to 
its own standard the Board is not really supposed to be an umpire – it is 
supposed to be establishing laboratory conditions.25  It needs to see itself as 
an advocate for the employees, not a referee in a contest between union and 
employer.26  The “irrational” trope seems nihilistic and condescending; can 
it really be that we don’t know anything about what information employees 
want?  In fact, the Board seems to contradict this in its final argument, 
which claims that employees don’t really care if the union is going into 
trusteeship.  I do not share the Board’s sanguinity on this.  The Teamsters’ 
decision to take over the local demonstrates something about the ability of 
the local to do its job well. 
                                                                                                                           
 21 Id. at 68 (“[The Board] argues that no one knows what diverse information the electorate might 
find useful in assessing the pros and cons of unionism.”). 
 22 For this proposition, the Board apparently relied on Derek C. Bok, The Regulation of        
Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. 
REV. 38, 65 (1964).  See Fla. Mining, 481 F.2d at 68. 
 23 Id.  
 24 Id.  The court appears to have disagreed somewhat on the ramifications of trusteeship.  Id. 
(“We do note, however, that the Board admits the revelation of the trusteeship would have brought to 
light all of the problems present in the administration of this local.”).  
 25 As I have argued previously, this failure to insure that the employee receives the proper level of 
information “does not comport with the laboratory conditions model, where information would play a 
critical role in establishing the conditions for a fair and reasoned choice.”  Bodie, Information, supra 
note 6, at 24. 
 26 For more on the problems with the “political election” model, see Craig Becker, Democracy in 
the Workplace: Union Representation Elections and Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495 (1993); 
Bodie, Information, supra note 6, at 31-34, 45-69. 
622 FIU Law Review [5:617 
 
Florida Mining remains a footnote to history, if that.  The Board has 
never really seriously considered implementing a regime of information 
disclosure.  The only required disclosure in the election context is proce-
dural in nature.  Under the Excelsior doctrine, employers must disclose the 
names and addresses of employees in the unit to the union after an election 
petition has been filed.27  This Excelsior requirement gives the union the 
ability to provide information to employees, and it was justified on that 
basis.28  However, the Board has yet to expand this requirement to include 
phone numbers or email addresses.29  And the Board provides no formal 
method to channel information from unions and employers to employees.30 
The only other example of information disclosure relating to elections 
under Board law is the recent requirement imposed by Dana Corp., that 
employees be informed of their right to file a decertification petition within 
forty-five days of the employer’s voluntary recognition of the union.31  If 
employees never receive notice of their right to file such a petition, then the 
Board will not apply the “voluntary recognition” election bar to prevent 
employees from filing a decertification petition.32  Like Excelsior, this noti-
fication requirement pertains more to procedure than substance.  It simply 
requires that employees be informed of one of the rights they can exercise 
under the Act before those rights can be limited through the recognition 
bar.33  If they are not so informed, then those rights will not be limited. 
In short, the Board has no history of mandatory information disclosure 
and has evinced little desire to create one.  However, I would argue that this 
reluctance is based on outdated, overblown, and even offensive policy 
judgments that should be reconsidered in this new century.  And if the 
Board were interested in ensuring that employees get a baseline of infor-
                                                                                                                           
 27 Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1239-40 (1966) (requiring that the information 
must be given to the union within seven days of the approval of an election agreement).   
 28 Id. at 1240 (“[A]n employee who has had an effective opportunity to hear the arguments con-
cerning representation is in a better position to make a more fully informed and reasonable choice. 
Accordingly, we think that it is appropriate for us to remove the impediment to communication to which 
our new rule is directed.”).   
 29 See G. Micah Wissinger, Informing Workers of the Right to Workplace Representation: Rea-
sonably Moving from the Middle of the Highway to the Information Superhighway, 78 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 331, 342-43 (2003) (proposing that unions be given private employee email addresses as part of 
the Excelsior disclosure). 
 30 For discussions of the limitations of employee communication and discourse, see Bodie,   
Information, supra note 6, at 23-24; Hirsch, supra note 7. 
 31 In re Dana Corp., 353 N.L.R.B. 434, 434 (2007). 
 32 Id. (“[N]o election bar will be imposed after a card-based recognition unless (1) employees in 
the bargaining unit receive notice of the recognition and of their right, within 45 days of the notice, to 
file a decertification petition or to support the filing of a petition by a rival union, and (2) 45 days pass 
from the date of notice without the filing of a valid petition.”). 
 33 Id. 
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mation necessary to making their decision, it could bootstrap onto other 
disclosure regimes that provide a lot of relevant data.  The Board would not 
have to start from scratch. 
B. Disclosure under the LMRDA 
Although a regime of information disclosure would be new for the    
union representation campaign, it would not be new for the unions them-
selves.  The Board regulates the relationship between union and employers 
and creates the regulatory regime for the initial choice by employees of 
whether to join a union.  The Department of Labor, on the other hand, over-
sees the management and organization of the union itself, including internal 
union elections and a union’s relationship with its members.  While the 
NLRB may not require disclosure in the representation election context, the 
Department of Labor requires unions to provide extensive disclosure to 
their members.
 34  This disclosure is required under the Labor-Management 
Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA or Landrum-Griffin Act), and    
covers much of the union’s internal governance and finances.  A system of 
mandatory disclosure in the representation context could piggyback off the 




Since 1960 the Department of Labor has provided forms through 
which unions meet the disclosure requirements under Landrum-Griffin.  
Form LM-1 provides for disclosure of dues, fees, and organizational struc-
ture under section 201(a) of the Act.35   Forms LM-2, LM-3, and LM-4 are 
the annual reports that cover a union’s organizational and financial disclo-
sure under LMRDA section 201(a) and (b).36  Form LM-2 is the form for 
largest unions; the amounts changed over time, but 2003 amendments 
placed the threshold at unions with receipts of $250,000 or more.37  The 
                                                                                                                           
 34 In many ways, the split between the two systems resembles the split in regulation of the sale of 
securities.  The federal system of required disclosure for the sale of corporate securities proceeds largely 
in two steps.  First, before a firm decides to offer a security for sale, it must proffer extensive infor-
mation about itself, its finances, its prospects, the expected price, and other information deemed relevant 
to potential buyers.  Second, once the security has been sold to initial buyers and thereafter is traded on 
the public markets, firms have a continuing obligation to disclose relevant financial information, insider 
transactions, executive compensation, and other matters relevant to the security’s value.  Each step is 
established largely by one of the New Deal securities acts: the Securities Act of 1933 is primarily about 
initial disclosure, while the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 primarily concerns the trading of securities 
on public markets. THOMAS L. HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION [ch. 1] (4th 
ed. 2002).  In this respect, as in the market for union representation, there are two disclosure paradigms: 
one for the initial “purchase” and one for “members” after purchase. 
 35 29 C.F.R. §§ 402.2-402.3 (2006). 
 36 29 U.S.C. § 431 (2006). 
 37 29 C.F.R. § 403.2(d). 
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Department of Labor estimates that while only twenty percent of unions 
meet this threshold, these unions received about ninety-three percent of the 
total dollars received annually by unions.38  Forms LM-3 and LM-4 are 
simplified for smaller unions.39  Along with these annual forms are specific 
forms for certain types of disclosures.  Form LM-30 pertains to potential 
conflicts of interest on the part of union employees or their families.  Form 
LM-10 requires employers to disclose payments made to unions.  Unions 
under trusteeship must also file a specific set of forms.40   
As it happens, I am writing this contribution in the midst of adminis-
trative change.  During the Bush Administration, the Department of Labor 
gave many of these forms their first significant overhaul in more than forty 
years.41 These changes were challenged in court and partially struck down.42  
Amendments to the regulation made by the Bush Administration Depart-
ment of Labor were published in the Federal Register the day after Presi-
dent Obama’s inauguration.43  The Obama Department of Labor is now in 
the process of undoing some of these changes.44  What follows is a more 
detailed discussion of the disclosure requirements provided for by the    
Department of Labor’s current regulations.  The reader is cautioned, how-
ever, that further changes may soon be forthcoming. 
1. Dues and Fees 
The LMRDA evinces a key interest in the regulation of union dues and 
fees.  Section 101(a)(3) of the Act provides that local dues can only be    
increased through a secret ballot majority vote of the membership.45       
Section 201(a) requires unions to provide information on “the initiation fee 
or fees required” as well as “the regular dues or fees or other periodic pay-
ments required to remain a member.”46  Form LM-1 requires that the union 
                                                                                                                           
 38 Recent Regulation: Department of Labor Increases Union Financial Reporting Requirements, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 1734, 1736 (2004) [hereinafter Recent Regulation]. 
 39 Form LM-3 is a four-page report for unions with receipts less than $200,000, 29 C.F.R. § 
403.4(a)(1) (2006), and Form LM-4 is a two-page report for unions with receipts of less than $10,000, 
id. § 403.4(a)(2). 
 40 See Forms LM-15, 29 C.F.R. §§ 408.3, 408.4 (2006); LM-15A, 29 C.F.R. §§ 408.4, 408.8 
(2006); LM-16, 29 C.F.R. § 408.8 (2006). 
 41 See 68 Fed. Reg. 58,374 (Oct. 9, 2003). 
 42 AFL-CIO v. Chao, 409 F.3d 377 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 43 74 Fed. Reg. 3678 (Jan. 21, 2009). 
 44 See 74 Fed. Reg. 52,401, 52,402 (Oct. 13, 2009) (discussing the proposed changes). 
 45 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(3) (2006).  Dues for federation of national or international labor organiza-
tions can only be raised through a majority vote of the delegates voting at a convention, a majority vote 
in a membership referendum conducted by secret ballot, or as an interim matter, by majority vote of the 
members of the executive board.  Id. 
 46 Id. § 431(a)(3)-(4). 
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set forth its dues and fees structure as an initial matter.47  Forms LM-2, LM-
3, and LM-4 provide for the annual disclosure of the dues and fees required 
by the union for members.48  The categories are regular dues and fees,     
initiation fees, transfer fees, and work permits.49 
2. Organizational Structure 
Section 201(a) of the LMRDA requires unions to provide the Depart-
ment of Labor with a copy of its constitution and bylaws.50  In addition, the 
union is required to file a report providing: the names and titles of union 
officers; the union’s dues and fees structure; and detailed statements about 
the union’s procedures for such matters as qualifications for or restrictions 
on membership, authorization for disbursement of funds, audit of financial 
transactions of the labor organization, the calling of regular and special 
meetings, the selection of officers and stewards, disciplinary fines and sus-
pensions, authorization for bargaining demands, ratification of contract 
terms, and authorization for strikes.51  
Form LM-1 provides for the disclosure of this information and must be 
filed within 90 days of when a union becomes subject to the LMRDA.52   
Along with its constitution and bylaws, the union must prepare a report 
citing to the page, section, or paragraph number of the governing docu-
ments that cover the procedures discussed in the statute itself, such as quali-
fications for or restrictions on membership and authorization for disburse-
ment of funds.53  The initial report also requires the union to list its officers, 
as well as the date of the next election.54  In its annual financial report, the 
union is required to list all of its officers,55 the date of its next election of 
officers,56 and the number of members it has.57  
                                                                                                                           
 47 Form   LM-1   Labor   Organization   Information  Report  2,  http://www.dol.gov/olms/regs/ 
compliance/GPEA_Forms/lm-1p.pdf. 
 48 Form LM-2 Labor Organization Annual Report 2, http://www.dol.gov/olms/regs/compliance/ 
lm2_blankForm.pdf; Form LM-3 Labor Organization Annual Report 2, http://www.dol.gov/olms/regs/ 
compliance/lm3_blankForm.pdf; Form LM-4  Labor  Organization  Annual  Report 2, 
http://www.dol.gov/esa/regs/compliance/olms/lm4_blankForm.pdf. 
 49 Form LM-2, supra note 48, at 2; Form LM-3, supra note 48, at 2.  Form LM-2 also includes a 
category for “working” dues and fees, as opposed to regular dues and fees.  Form LM-2, supra note 48, 
at 2.  Form LM-4 only requires the union to report any changes in its dues or fees structure.  Form LM-
4, supra note 48, at 2. 
 50 29 U.S.C. § 431(a). 
 51 Id. 
 52 Form LM-1, supra note 47. 
 53 29 C.F.R. § 402.1 (2009); Form LM-1, supra note 47, at 3. 
 54 Form LM-1, supra note 47, at 2. 
 55 Form LM-2, supra note 48, at Schedule 11; Form LM-3, supra note 48, at 3. 
 56 Form LM-2, supra note 48, at 2; Form LM-3, supra note 48, at 2. 
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3. Financial Disclosure 
LMRDA § 201(b) requires that unions file annual reports, signed by 
the president and treasurer, disclosing details about the union’s financial 
condition and operations.58  Specifically, the Act requires disclosure of    
assets and liabilities, receipts during the year and sources for the receipts, 
salaries, and other disbursements for all officers and employees making 
more than $10,000, loans of more than $250 to officers and employees, all 
loans to business enterprises, and “other disbursements made by [the     
union].”59  The Secretary of the Department of Labor is given authority to 
prescribe the rules and regulations for filing the annual reports.60 
Prior to the 2003 changes, the Department of Labor asked unions to 
disclose their overall assets and liabilities, as well as their general receipts 
and disbursements.61  Under the 2003 changes, unions who file the LM-2 
are not only required to list their general receipts and disbursements, but to 
itemize them as well (for amounts greater than $5,000).62  Separate      
schedules provide for the itemization of accounts receivable,63 loans      
receivable,64 investments and fixed assets,65 and other assets and liabilities.66    
Unions also must itemize individual receipts and disbursements made to 
support particular union functions, such as contract negotiation and admin-
istration, organizing, and political activities.67  In addition to these itemiza-
tions, unions must break down the time each officer or employee spends on 
the various activities of the organization.68 
                                                                                                                           
 57 Form LM-2, supra note 48, at 2; Form LM-3, supra note 48, at 2; Form LM-4, supra note 48, 
at 2. 
 58 29 U.S.C. § 431(b) (2006). 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. § 438. 
 61 See Recent Regulation, supra note 38, at 1735. 
 62 68 Fed. Reg. 58,374, 58,429-30 (Oct. 9, 2003). 
 63 See 2003 Form LM-2 (copy on file with author). 
 64 Id. at Schedule 2. 
 65 Id. at Schedule 3 (sales of investments and fixed assets); id. at Schedule 4 (purchases of    
investments and fixed assets); id. at Schedule 5 (investments); Schedule 6 (fixed assets). 
 66 Id. at Schedule 7 (other assets); id. at Schedule 10 (other liabilities). 
 67 See id.  Schedule 14 covers “other receipts,” schedule 15 covers “contract negotiation and 
administration,” schedule 16 covers “organizing,” schedule 17 covers “political activities,” schedule 18 
covers “lobbying,” schedule 19 covers “contributions, gifts, and grants,” schedule 20 covers “benefits,” 
schedule 21 covers “general overhead,” and schedule 22 covers “other disbursements.”  See also  Form 
LM-2  Labor Organization Annual Report 18, http://www.dol.gov/olms/ 
regs/compliance/lm2_blankForm.pdf.  .  
 68 68 Fed. Reg. at 58,471; Form LM-2, supra note 48, at Schedule 11. 
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The 2003 changes to the financial disclosure forms largely remain in 
place.69  However, on the day after President Obama’s inauguration, the 
Department of Labor published a new set of rules requiring even further 
financial disclosure.70  The new rules required unions to disclose additional 
information in the context of asset and investment transactions, disburse-
ments to officers and employees, and itemization of certain categories of 
receipts.71  However, this rule had been rescinded by the Department in   
October 2003.72  The Department argued that a more thorough investigation 
on the effects of the 2003 changes to the LM-2 was needed before           
additional changes to the forms were made.73   
4. Conflicts of Interest. 
Much of the work of the McClellan Committee – a precursor to 
Landrum-Griffin – focused on widespread graft and self-dealing by union 
officials.74  Section 202 of the LMRDA requires union officers and employ-
ees to disclose a wide array of potential conflicts of interest.75  These disclo-
sures include any financial interests held by an employee in a business   
represented by the union, any transactions between such a business and a 
union employee, and any payments made by a represented business to the 
union or its employees.  The statute is very specific:  A union employee 
must disclose, for example, “any transaction in which he or his spouse or 
minor child engaged, directly or indirectly, involving any stock, bond, secu-
rity, or loan to or from, or other legal or equitable interest in the business of 
an employer whose employees such labor organization represents or is   
actively seeking to represent.”76  Similarly, all transactions must be        
disclosed “except work performed and payments and benefits received as a 
                                                                                                                           
 69 In AFL-CIO v. Chao, 409 F.3d 377 (D.C. Cir. 2005), the court upheld the changes to the LM-2, 
but struck down Form T-1, a supplemental form regarding general trust reporting.  The court found that 
Form T-1 exceeded the Department’s authority.  Id. at 378.  The Department recently proposed rescind-
ing the T-1 and moving some of the required disclosure into the LM-2.  75 Fed. Reg. 5456 (Feb. 2, 
2010). 
 70 74 Fed. Reg. 3678 (Jan. 21, 2009). 
 71 Id.; see also 74 Fed. Reg. 52,401, 52,402 (Oct. 13, 2009) (discussing the proposed changes). 
 72 74 Fed. Reg. at 52,402. 
 73 Id. at 52,402, 52,409.  The Department also rescinded the rules regarding the Department’s 
ability to revoke a union’s authorization to file an LM-3 form.  Id. at 52409-52412.  The former Labor 
Secretary has criticized these moves.  Elaine L. Chao, Obama Tries to Stop Union Disclosure, WALL ST. 
J., May 6, 2009. 
 74 Benjamin Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARV. L. 
REV. 851, 883 (1960) (discussing “the sordid record, gathered by the McClellan Committee, of the 
misuse of union funds by some officers and employees”). 
 75 29 U.S.C. § 432 (2006). 
 76 Id. § 432(a)(2). 
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bona fide employee of such employer and except purchases and sales of 
goods or services in the regular course of business at prices generally avail-
able to any employee of such employer.”77   
Employers have their own set of disclosures related to conflicts of     
interest.  The LMRDA requires that employers disclose any payments made 
to union officials or employees – a reciprocal obligation to that of the    
union’s.78  Employers must also disclose any payments made to employees 
or to outside labor consultants in an effort to persuade employees to exer-
cise or not to exercise their collective rights.79  Such payments include those 
designed to interfere in collective rights or to obtain information on       
employee or union efforts related to a dispute with the employer.80  Courts 
have determined that section 203 reflects “the congressional conviction that 
quite without regard to the motives or methods of particular individuals 
engaging in it, the persuader business was detrimental to good labor rela-
tions and the continued public interest.”81 
Regulations regarding the disclosure of such conflict of interest pay-
ments are in flux.  Form LM-30, which covers conflict of interest disclo-
sures for unions, was amended by the Department of Labor in 2007.  The 
revisions increased the disclosures from two pages to nine pages and re-
quired greater detail on the nature and purpose of the transaction.  However, 
in 2009 the Department announced rulemaking proceedings to review the 
changes to the form.  The Department’s website currently states that “fun-
damental questions regarding the scope and extent of the [2007 amended] 
reporting obligations are unanswered, and litigation challenging some    
aspects of the form remains pending.”82  Therefore, the Department will 
                                                                                                                           
 77 Id. § 432(a)(5). 
 78 Id. § 433(a)(1). 
 79 Id. § 433(a)(2)-(5). 
 80 Id. § 433(a)(4). 
 81 Price v. Wirtz, 412 F.2d 647, 650 (5th Cir. 1969). 
 82 Office of Labor-Management Standards, Form LM-30 Labor Organization Officer  and  Em-
ployee   Report,   at: http://www.dol.gov/olms/regs/compliance/GPEA_Forms/blanklmforms.htm# 
FLM30.  The website states: 
Note: The Office of Labor-Management Standards published in the Fall 2009 Semi-Annual Regu-
latory Agenda notice of an intended rulemaking to revise the Form LM-30 (Labor Organization 
Officer   and   Employee   Report).   See  http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule? 
pubId=200910&RIN=1215-AB74. The rulemaking is intended to review questions of policy and 
law surrounding these reporting requirements.  The rulemaking will focus on the changes resulting 
from a 2007 regulatory revision of the Form and instructions.  This revision dramatically al-
tered the old Form LM-30 and instructions, which had not substantially changed in over 40 
years.  Despite the promulgation of the new Form LM-30, fundamental questions regarding the 
scope and extent of the reporting obligations are unanswered, and litigation challenging some    
aspects of the form remains pending. In light of this uncertainty, the pending regulatory action, the 
pending litigation and the continuing obligation of union officers and employees pursuant to sec-
tion 202 of the Labor-Management and Reporting Disclosure Act (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. § 432, 
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accept either the pre- or the post-2007 form and will not bring enforcement 
actions based on a failure to use the new form.83 
5. Example: Local Union 1199, Service Employees Int’l Union 
Looking at an actual set of disclosures may assist in illuminating the 
nature and extent of those disclosures.  The 2004 LM-2 provided by Local 
1199 of the Service Employees International Union is one such example;84 
it is available online through a search of the Department of Labor’s web-
site.85  The 196-page document provides the annual disclosure for Local 
1199, one of the largest and most successful unions in the country.86        
According to the 2004 form, Local 1199 has 240,000 members, roughly 
$60 million in assets, and roughly $15 million in liabilities.87  Dues range 
from $13 to $75, with initiation fees ranging from $75 to $200.88  The union 
received over $100 million in dues, and total receipts were over $137 mil-
lion.  The LM-2 also provides a breakdown of investments, fixed assets, 
other assets, sales and purchases of investments and assets, and loans     
payable.89 
The LM-2 also provides a list of all officers as well as their total com-
pensation.  The form lists 131 officers who receive a total of over $5      
million in total compensation.90  Union president Dennis Rivera received 
$147,710 in total compensation for 2004.91  The form also itemizes all    
disbursements to employees; each employee is listed by name, title, and 
total compensation.92  Finally, there are schedules for benefits, contribu-
                                                                                                                           
OLMS has determined that it would not be a good use of resources to bring enforcement actions 
based upon a failure to use a specific form to comply with the statutory obligation to report certain 
financial information.  Accordingly, OLMS will refrain from initiating enforcement actions against 
union officers and union employees based solely on the failure to file the report required by sec-
tion 202, using the 2007 form, as long as individuals meet their statutorily-required filing obliga-
tion in some manner.  OLMS will accept either the old Form LM-30 or the new one for purposes 
of this non-enforcement policy.  
 83 Id.   
 84 Form LM-2 Labor Organization Annual Report, Local 1199, Service Employees International 
Union, March 28, 2005 (on file with author) [hereinafter Local 1199 Form LM-2]. 
 85 The Department of Labor, Office of Labor-Management Standards, maintains a website 
through which it is possible to obtain electronic versions of union annual reports.  Department of Labor, 
Public  Disclosure  under  the  LMRDA,  available  at  http://www.dol.gov/olms/regs/compliance/rrlo/ 
pubdiscl.htm.   
 86 For more information about Local 1199, visit its website at: http://www.1199seiu.org/.   
 87 Local 1199 Form LM-2, supra note 84, at 2, 3. 
 88 Id. at 2. 
 89 Id. at Schedules 1-8. 
 90 Id. at Schedule 9.  
 91 Id.  
 92 Id. at Schedule 10. 
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tions, gifts, grants, office and administrative expenses, and other receipts 
and disbursements.93 
C. Employer Disclosure under the Federal Securities Laws 
Perhaps the most comprehensive statutory and regulatory scheme of 
contractual regulation is the federal system of securities regulation.  Even 
before the New Deal, state blue sky laws placed special restrictions on the 
sale of securities beyond the common law.94  The Securities Act of 193395 
and the Securities Exchange Act of 193496 then completely reshaped the 
playing field.  They put into place a comprehensive federal system       
premised on antifraud protection and a process of mandatory disclosure.  
This scheme, while fleshed out through seventy years of amendment, regu-
lation, and  judicial  opinion,  retains  relatively  the  same  structure  with  
which  it began. 
The disclosure requirements mandated by federal regulation are con-
siderably broad.  In the context of an initial offering, section 5 of the 1993 
Act requires that issuers file a comprehensive registration statement with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission.97  Section 7 of the 1933 Act, 
along with Schedule A, sets forth the basics of the disclosure requirements 
and also empowers the Commission to establish further disclosure regula-
tions.98  Schedule A sets forth thirty-two separate provisions of disclosure, 
including the issuer’s articles of incorporation or other structural docu-
ments,99 the general character of the issuer’s business,100 the amount of out-
standing debt,101 remuneration paid to directors and officers,102 the security’s 
price (or method of calculating the price),103 items relating to possible con-
flicts of interest,104 a detailed balance sheet,105 and a profit and loss state-
ment.106  The Commission has further refined these requirements through a 
                                                                                                                           
 93 Id. at Schedules 11-15. 
 94 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. L. REV. 
347, 348 (1991). 
 95 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006). 
 96 Id. §§ 78a-78mm. 
 97 Id. § 77e. 
 98 Id. §§ 77g, 77aa. 
 99 Id. § 77aa(31). 
 100 Id. § 77aa(8). 
 101 Id. § 77aa(12). 
 102 Id. § 77aa(14). 
 103 Id. § 77aa(16). 
 104 See id. §§ 77aa(17) (commissions paid to underwriters); 77aa(20) (amounts paid to promoters); 
77aa(22) (recent issuer purchases of property held by directors or substantial stockholders). 
 105 Id. § 77aa(25). 
 106 Id. § 77aa(26). 
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series of forms and further regulations.  The Commission’s forms break 
down what information must merely be disclosed to the Commission and 
what information must also be provided in the prospectus, a document    
provided to potential purchasers.107  However, these forms generally refer to 
Regulation S-K to define what exactly must be provided.  Regulation S-K is 
significantly more detailed than Schedule A, detailing precisely what types 
of quantitative and qualitative information must be disclosed.108  For       
example, Regulation S-K has extremely detailed requirements on the      
disclosure of financial information,109 including a special provision on man-
agement’s discussion and analysis of the firm’s financial condition and   
results of its operations.110 
In the context of a securities offering, federal law integrates the         
required disclosure within an overall process of restrictions on information 
dissemination.  Section 5(c) of the 1933 Act prohibits all offers to sell the 
securities prior to the filing of the registration statement.111  However, the 
Commission has given an extremely broad definition to the term “offer,” 
holding that any communication reasonably calculated to generate a buying 
interest is an offer.112  After the registration materials have been filed, the 
issue enters the “waiting period” until the Commission has made the regis-
tration statement effective.  Offers to sell made during the waiting period 
must generally also provide all of the information required in the prospec-
tus.113  Since some of this information may not be available until the      
offering price has been set, it may be impossible to furnish the required 
prospectus during the waiting period.114  The Commission thus has made a 
limited exception to this Catch-22 by allowing “tombstone ads”115 and    
preliminary “red herring” prospectuses.116  Once the waiting period has 
                                                                                                                           
 107 See, e.g., Form S-1, Registration Statement under the Securities Act of 1933, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/forms-1.pdf.   
 108 Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10-229.702 (2010). 
 109 See id. §§ 229.301-229.304. 
 110 See id. § 229.303. 
 111 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c). 
 112 Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co., 38 S.E.C. 843 (1959); see also JAMES D. COX & THOMAS L. 
HAZEN, CORPORATIONS 723 (2d ed. 2003).  There are some exceptions to this prohibition.  See SEC 
Rules 137-139, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.137-139 (2005). 
 113 See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(10) (defining any written offer as a prospectus); id. at § 77e(b)(1) 
(requiring all prospectuses to contain certain information once the registration statement has been filed). 
 114 COX & HAZEN, supra note 112, at 724. 
 115 See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(10); 17 C.F.R. § 230.134 (2005). 
 116 17 C.F.R. § 230.430 (2005).  This document is called a “red herring” prospectus because of the 
legend required by Item 501(b)(10) of Regulation S-K, which traditionally was in red ink.  See 17 C.F.R. 
§ 229.501(b)(10) (2010) (requiring the following legend: “The information in this prospectus is not 
complete and may be changed. We may not sell these securities until the registration statement filed with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission is effective.  This prospectus is not an offer to sell these secu-
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ended, all written offers for sale must be accompanied by a complete pro-
spectus.117 
Although quite complicated, the registration process is designed to   
accomplish three primary purposes: (1) make material information about 
the issuer public, (2) require the issuer to deliver some of that information 
to potential investors (through the prospectus), and (3) restrict the issuer’s 
opportunities to promote its securities outside of these channels.  It does not 
seem a stretch to say that the 1933 Act, and by extension the Commission, 
are endeavoring to create “laboratory conditions” for the sales of securities.  
They are trying to get material information to the consumer, and at the same 
time they are limiting opportunities for purchase without such information. 
In contrast to the 1933 Act’s focus on a security’s initial sale, the Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934 regulates the sales of securities after they have 
been issued and are traded on the open market.  The 1934 Act establishes a 
registration and supervision system for national securities exchanges118 and 
requires continuing disclosure for companies whose securities trade on 
those markets.119  The mandatory disclosure comes in the form of periodic 
reports: Form 10-K, an annual report; Form 10-Q, a quarterly report; and 
Form 8-K, an interim report required in limited circumstances.120  The 1934 
Act also regulates brokers, members, and dealers of the exchanges,121 and 
imposes certain requirements with respect to proxy solicitations and tender 
offers.122  The SEC also enacted Rule 10b-5, its comprehensive antifraud 
provision, under section10 of the 1934 Act. 
The SEC has been out front in delivering its required disclosure to    
securities consumers and the public.  In 1984 it first developed the Elec-
tronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval, system known as EDGAR.123  
EDGAR is an easily-searchable database of all disclosure filings made by 
companies covered by the 1933 and 1934 Acts.124  A quick search can    
retrieve all of a company’s registration statements, prospectuses, and peri-
                                                                                                                           
rities and it is not soliciting an offer to buy these securities in any state where the offer or sale is not 
permitted.”).   
 117 See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b). 
 118 Id. § 78f. 
 119 Id. § 78m. 
 120 See Amy Deen Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio? U.S. Investors are Unknowingly Financ-
ing State Sponsors of Terrorism, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 1151, 1209 n.353 (2010). 
 121 15 U.S.C. §§ 78k, 78o(c). 
 122 Id. §§ 78m, 78n. 
 123 Charles N. Charnas & D. Craig Nordlund, Introduction to Operational EDGAR: An Outline for 
Electronic Filing with the SEC, 969 PLI/CORP. 281, 285 (1997). 
 124 See SEC Filing & Forms (EDGAR), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
edgar.shtml. 
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odic reports filed on Forms 8-K, 10-K, and 10-Q.125  Since the mid 1990s, 
EDGAR had been an integral part of the disclosure process.126  The SEC 
requires that filers provide their disclosure using the EDGAR Filer Manual, 
now in its fourteenth version.127  Access to the disclosure is viewed as a 
critical part of the SEC’s mission, and the agency frequently tweaks its sys-
tems to provide better service.128 
Passed in the midst of the bust following the boom of the 1920s, the 
New Deal securities acts aimed at eliminating fraud through greater disclo-
sure and penalties for noncompliance.  Required disclosure was seen as a 
way of bringing more “sunlight,” in Brandeis’ famous phrase, into the inner 
workings of corporate shares.129  Preventing fraud was only one end of the 
spectrum, however.  On the other end, proponents and enforcers of the New 
Deal acts hoped that the outflow of information would lead to better pricing 
and trading on the markets.  The Acts, particularly the 1933 Act, were seen 
as a way of making sure the securities markets acted rationally.  In a 1933 
article supporting the legislation, William O. Douglas and George E. Bates 
wrote that the effects of the 1933 Act would be: “(1) prevention of excesses 
and fraudulent transactions, which will be hampered and deterred merely by 
the requirement that their deals be revealed; and (2) placing in the market 
during the early stages of the life of a security a body of facts which, oper-
ating indirectly through investment services and expert investors, will tend 
to produce more accurate appraisal of the worth of the security. . . .”130  
Echoing the thoughts of Douglas and Bates, the SEC later explained the 
purpose of the 1933 Act as twofold: 
The Securities Act, often referred to as the ‘truth in securities’ Act, 
was designed not only to provide investors with adequate information 
upon which to base their decisions to buy and sell securities, but also 
to protect legitimate business seeking to obtain capital through honest 
protestation against competition from crooked promoters. . . .131 
                                                                                                                           
 125 SEC, Researching Public Companies through EDGAR: A Guide for Investors, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/edgarguide.htm.  
 126 Charnas & Nordlund, supra note 123, at 286. 
 127 17 C.F.R. § 232.301 (2010). 
 128 See, e.g., SEC, EDGAR Search Updates, available at http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/ 
edgarsearchupdates.htm. 
 129 See LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914) 
(“Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases.  Sunlight is said to be the 
best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”).   
 130 William O. Douglas & George E. Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 
172 (1933). 
 131 10 S.E.C. Ann. Rep. 14 (1944); see also Securities and Exchange Commission, The Work of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission 1 (1967) (stating that the New Deal Acts require disclosure so 
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II.  A NEW MODEL FOR REPRESENTATION ELECTION REGULATION 
This paper seeks to start the conversation about the specifics of a new 
model for regulating the union representation election.  The current system 
is a strange admixture of ambiguous and heavy-handed requirements about 
what may be said combined with a completely hands-off approach to what 
must be said.  As a result, unions and employers must step carefully during 
the campaign so as to avoid statements or conduct that violate the Board’s 
“laboratory conditions” doctrine.  At the same time, the Board makes no 
effort to ensure that employees get the information they need to make an 
economically rational decision other than to provide unions with the names 
and addresses of those workers whom they are courting.  In order to rede-
sign the regulation surrounding the union representation election, I propose 
four facets to a new regulatory model: (a) required disclosure by unions; (b) 
optional disclosure by employers, if they wish to participate in the cam-
paign; (c) a more hands-off approach to regulation, except in the case of 
misrepresentation; and (d) protected space for employee discourse.  These 
four reforms are discussed in more detail below. 
A.  Required Union Disclosure 
The union representation election process suffers from informational 
failures.  Information is distributed asymmetrically, and unions and em-
ployers may lack the proper incentives to ensure that employees get the 
information they need to make the decision.  As in the securities regulation 
context, as well as many other contractual contexts, a system of mandatory 
information disclosure would be useful in ensuring that consumers get rele-
vant information. 
What would such a system look like?  My hope is that this piece will 
begin the debate about exactly this question.  Here are a few thoughts about 
the content of the disclosure, as well as the means of delivering that content 
to employees. 
1. Content 
What sorts of information are relevant and material to the union repre-
sentation question?  The answer may vary by election, by individual, and by 
time period.  Further empirical research would be extremely useful in de-
                                                                                                                           
that “investors may make a realistic appraisal of the merits of securities and thus exercise an informed 
judgment in determining whether to purchase them”), quoted in George J. Bentson, The Effectiveness 
and Effects of the SEC’s Accounting Disclosure Requirements, in ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE 
REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 23, 24 (Henry G. Manne ed. 1969). 
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termining exactly what workers want to know in making their decision.132  
The following categories serve as a starting point in determining what data 
workers might want. 
(a) Dues and fees.  Obviously, employees would want to know how 
much their dues would be and what initiation fees would be required.  The 
LMRDA requires disclosure of union dues in both the union’s initial filings 
and in its annual reports.133  As the Local 1199 SEIU example demonstrates, 
however, the union may disclose a range of dues and fees rather than a spe-
cific amount.  In such cases, employees would want to know exactly how 
much the union is proposing to charge in their particular case. 
Employees may also want a sense of whether those dues are likely to 
change in the next few years.  Given the difficulties of exit, employees are 
essentially signing up for as much as a three-year contract when they agree 
to union representation.  Although unions may not know what their future 
financial needs will be, they may have information about future dues prices 
that would be useful to the employees’ decision.  The union could be     
required to disclose whether any dues or fees hikes are set to be voted on by 
the members, or whether union officials have plans for such an increase in 
the upcoming year. 
(b) Organizational structure.  Like any organization, potential mem-
bers generally would want to know how the union is structured and what its 
policies are for members.  The union must disclose its constitution and by-
laws under the LMRDA.  Form LM-1 asks the union to list such infor-
mation as qualifications for or restrictions on membership, authorization for 
disbursement of funds, the types of audits the labor organization undergoes, 
the calling of regular and special meetings, the selection of officers and 
stewards, the circumstances under which fines, suspensions, or expulsions 
can be imposed, and the requirements for authorizing bargaining demands, 
contract terms, and strikes.134  In addition, members may want to know who 
the union officials are, their backgrounds, and perhaps even their salaries.135  
                                                                                                                           
 132 As discussed earlier, one empirical study discounted the importance of information received by 
employees during the campaign.  See JULIUS G. GETMAN ET AL., UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: 
LAW AND REALITY 62-64 (1976) (finding employees generally voted as they thought they would before 
the campaign); id. at 76-80 (finding a low recognition rate for campaign issues); id. at 140-43 (arguing 
that hands-off regulation is proper, given the lack of importance to the campaign itself).  However, as 
noted, critics have charged that the data did not support the authors’ normative claims.  See Bodie, 
Information, supra note 6, at 30 (discussing criticism). In addition, the study was focused on whether 
the campaign affected workers’ attitudes, not whether workers were getting the information they needed 
to make economically rational decisions. 
 133 Form LM-1, supra note 47; Form LM-2, supra note 48. 
 134 Form LM-1, supra note 47. 
 135 The question of salaries is likely to provoke some controversy.  On the one hand, corporations 
are required to disclose salary information under federal securities law on the theory that shareholders 
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Form LM-2 requires the disclosure of officials and disbursements to offi-
cials.  Officials could also be required to provide a short biography that 
includes certain specific facts, such as education, work experience, criminal 
record, and time with the union. 
(c) Nature and Quality of Services.  Perhaps the most important set of 
information for employees would concern the nature and quality of the   
representation services provided by the union.  There is a distinct infor-
mation asymmetry with respect to information about the union’s services.136  
Employees who have never belonged to the union do not know how well 
the union will do in negotiating new terms, avoiding strikes, managing 
grievances, and keeping dues low.  When buying a product, consumers can 
often see and handle the product, and they are often given the right to return 
the product if they find it unsatisfactory.  Home buyers hire inspectors, tour 
the home, and still benefit from mandatory disclosure requirements on the 
part of the seller.  Union consumers must base their judgment on the infor-
mation provided during the campaign, along with any prior knowledge, 
opinions, or prejudices they may bring with them to the decision. 
There may be ways to get information about performance to           
employees making a representation decision.  The union’s past and current 
collective bargaining agreements provide concrete facts about the terms and 
conditions the union has negotiated for other employees.  Having access to 
these contracts would provide a way for workers to comparison-shop.  A 
more speculative form of information would be union predictions about 
what they expect to negotiate with the employer.  The union might present 
information about what its initial demands would be, and it could even   
provide information about what it expects to get.  It could even disclose the 
risk that the union will not be able to negotiate a contract, or the likelihood 
that the union will call the employees out on strike. 
In the world of securities regulation, firms making an initial public   
offering are required to disclose reams of financial information about them-
                                                                                                                           
should know what their agents are making.  See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2006); cf. SEC Release Nos. 33-
8655, 34-53185 (Jan. 27, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8655.pdf (proposing 
new rules for executive compensation disclosure).  Given that union members have some of the same 
agency costs concerns that shareholders do, compensation information may be material.  See Stewart J. 
Schwab, Union Raids, Union Democracy, and the Market for Union Control, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 367, 
377-83.  However, the purchasers of services generally do not have the right to see the executive com-
pensation for the company from whom they are buying the services.  To the extent that employees are 
simply consumers of union representation services, such information could be much less relevant in 
comparison to the quality of the services.  Cf. Samuel Estreicher, Deregulating Union Democracy, 2000 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 501, 516-17 (arguing that for-profit unions should be allowed to provide union 
representation services). 
 136 Bodie, Information, supra note 6, at 47-51. 
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selves.137  Companies are even expected to make predictions about what 
future events may damage their prospects of being successful in business.138  
One could envision a disclosure statement in which unions provided a   
richer vision of what they expected to achieve and the difficulties they con-
templated facing as part of a mandatory disclosure statement.  Of course, 
unions would generally endeavor to be as non-specific as possible in order 
to avoid recriminations or liability down the road.  Unions could also plau-
sibly argue that such statements would reveal too much of their strategies 
and would enable the employer to get an advantage in bargaining.  As we 
consider a mandatory disclosure regime, the pros and cons of such “softer” 
statements should be considered alongside the disclosure of “harder” finan-
cial data. 
(d) Conflicts of Interest.  The corporate world places a premium on 
disclosure whenever a potential conflict of interest arises between a corpo-
rate officer and the corporation he or she serves.139  Employees are entitled 
to know about any potential conflict of interest between the union and the 
employer.  Evidence of such a conflict would be any overlap between union 
personnel and the employer’s personnel, including spouses and other close 
relatives, or financial ties between the union and the employer.140  Current 
or past collective bargaining relationships between the union and the     
employer (or an associated company) might also be grounds for a conflict 
of interest.  Moreover, any contracts between the employer and its affiliates 
and the union (or its affiliates) should also be disclosed to employees.  The 
key here would be to have a sweep broad enough to encompass all of the 
potential conflicts.  For example, Teri Moore may be president of the    
United Forever Union (UFU) and may negotiate a fairly employer-friendly 
contract with Blue Industries.  If Teri also is the treasurer for Americans 
United Union (AUU), and AUU is seeking to represent employees of     
Aquamarine Industries, a subsidiary of Blue Industries, then Aquamarine 
employees should be told about and given access to the UFU contract with 
Blue Industries.  The regulations would have to be written to prevent     
                                                                                                                           
 137 See Part I.C supra. 
 138 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2006) (requiring that the filer “[d]escribe any known trends or uncer-
tainties that have had or that the registrant reasonably expects will have a material favorable or unfavor-
able impact on net sales or revenues or income from continuing operations”). 
 139 See, e.g., State ex rel. Hayes Oyster, Co. v. Keypoint Oyster Co., 391 P.2d 979, 986 (Wash. 
1964) (”A corporation cannot ratify the breach of fiduciary duties unless full and complete disclosure of 
all facts and circumstances is made by the fiduciary and an intentional relinquishment by the corporation 
of its rights.”). 
 140 Such ties could be quite attenuated.  It would be important to identify all companies in which 
the employer had a significant ownership stake and to include those companies in any analysis. 
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employers and unions from avoiding the disclosure requirements simply by 
creating new corporations or labor organizations.   
But aside from this concern, the Board would easily be able to provide 
this information to employees by piggybacking on top of existing disclosure 
required.  Unions and employers are unlikely to provide this information 
themselves during the course of the campaign.  In fact, the incentives are 
inverse: the more troublesome the disclosures would be (for both union and 
employer), the less likely they are to be disclosed.141  Although industrious 
employees might find these disclosures on their own, the Board would pro-
vide a real service by making sure employees get this information as part of 
ensuring that “laboratory conditions” exist. 
2. Delivery 
Technology may provide the answer to this dilemma.  The Board could 
provide for the mandatory disclosure in two steps.  The first step would be a 
short form distributed to all employees with a few pieces of critical infor-
mation included.  The second step would be an Internet website, similar to 
EDGAR, that would provide access to all of the other information the 
Board required to be disclosed.  In this manner, all employees would be 
given a set of disclosures that many would be likely to read.  At the same 
time, the few more industrious employees would have channeled access to 
important information that may take much longer to absorb. 
The primary issue surrounding the first step would be determining the 
exact scope of the information to be provided.  While the Board would want 
to gather more information and could even consider rulemaking on this 
issue,142 commentators may want to focus on determining what sorts of   
information employees most want and how to convey that information most 
concisely.  Union dues and fees applicable to the voting employees, for 
example, could be specified briefly.  Terms and conditions of employment 
in the union’s other collective bargaining agreements could not.  To some 
extent, the Board might want to use the short form to tip off employees 
about information they could get through the website.  However, for the 
                                                                                                                           
 141 See Bodie, Information, supra note 6; Benjamin I. Sachs, Enabling Employee Choice: A Struc-
tural Approach to the Rules of Union Organizing, 123 HARV. L. REV. 655 (2010). 
 142 For advocacy of more rulemaking by the Board, see Samuel Estreicher, Policy Oscillation at 
the Labor Board: A Plea for Rulemaking, 37 ADMIN. L. REV. 163 (1985); Samuel Estreicher & Matthew 
T. Bodie, Review Essay: Administrative Delay at the NLRB: Some Modest Proposals, 23 J. LAB. RES. 
87, 98-99 (2002).  For a discussion of the Board’s antipathy towards rulemaking, see Joan Flynn, The 
Costs and Benefits of “Hiding the Ball”: NLRB Policymaking and the Failure of Judicial Review, 75 
B.U. L. REV. 387 (1995). 
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most part the Board would want to keep the short form as a simple sum-
mary of the most critical facts about the union and its services. 
The primary issues surrounding the second step would be the design of 
the website, the costs in implementing the system, and the likelihood that 
employees would benefit from the system.  In terms of the design, this 
again is an issue for future policy development by the Board.  It should be 
fairly straightforward, however, to design a standard page for each election 
which would provide access to the additional sets of information.  The   
Department of Labor has brought its entire LMRDA disclosure system 
online, making it fairly simple to link to the Department of Labor’s website 
or even directly link to the particular union’s disclosure within the Depart-
ment’s database.143  Other documents, such as the union’s past and present 
collective bargaining agreements, could be posted to the page as documents 
that could be downloaded.  Moreover, the page could also link to the     
union’s website in order to provide access to information.  In terms of costs, 
it is fairly simple to create a webpage, and Board technicians could use the 
same web design for each representation election.144  It would be far simpler 
to post electronic versions of collective bargaining agreements on the web, 
as opposed to photocopying these agreements and distributing them to    
employees. 
There is some question as to whether employees would use such a   
system.  However, computer ownership and Internet use continue to grow 
across the country.145  Many employees have access to the Internet at work.  
As many other commentators have suggested, using the web is a cost-
effective, extremely accessible method of distributing lots of information to 
                                                                                                                           
 143 See Final Regulations, 68 Fed. Reg. at58,374-75; Department of Labor, LMRDA Reporting & 
Disclosure, at: http://www.dol.gov/compliance/laws/comp-lmrda.htm.  Interestingly, ERISA has a   
requirement that the Secretaries of Labor and the Treasury work together when they are requesting 
similar information.  29 U.S.C. § 1204 (2006).  The NLRB could similarly work with other branches of 
the Department of Labor to make sure that LMRDA-required information was provided to employees in 
the midst of a union organizing drive.  
 144 In his commentary on my paper, Harold Maier raised a number of questions with regard to the 
content and mechanics of such a website.  A straightforward template would be necessary to allow the 
Board’s regional offices to get the disclosure websites operating quickly and efficiently.  Certainly, there 
are many questions at the margins about what this template would look like.  However, the Board can 
develop a disclosure structure that would be sufficiently mechanical for the routine use.  A very rudi-
mentary disclosure regime might make sense at the beginning; after all, it took the SEC roughly a   
decade (1985-1994) to develop a fully operational disclosure database.  See Charnas & Nordlund, supra 
note 123, at 285-86. 
 145 Recent studies have found that over eighty percent of Americans use the Internet, and two-
thirds have a high-speed Internet connection at home.  Aaron Smith, Home Broadband 2010, Pew   
Research Center (Aug. 11, 2010), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/Press-Releases/2010/Home-
Broadband-2010.aspx.   
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a large number of employees.146  It can overcome the Lechmere access prob-
lems that have made it difficult for information to reach employees.  
Providing unions with access to the employees (electronically) together 
with employee access to mandatory disclosure about the union would    
provide an ideal mix of information to employees. 
B.  Employer Disclosure 
This article has focused primarily on the need for employees to get   
information about the union offering its services.  Given that unions are 
seeking to provide services on behalf of the employees, it makes sense to 
focus on their dues, internal organization, quality of services and potential 
conflicts of interest.  However, information about the employer is also    
relevant to the representation decision.147  Although there is ample ground 
for further discussion and research, this article proposes a system of       
employer disclosure in which employers would be given an option.  The 
employer could provide a set of mandatory disclosures and then participate 
in the campaign, or the employer could remain neutral and provide no dis-
closure.  This option would provide employers with a choice.  They could 
contest the union’s efforts by putting their own cards on the table, or they 
could stay out of the process entirely. 
What kinds of information would the employer provide?  Again, fur-
ther research is necessary to determine exactly what kinds of employer   
information are relevant and important to making a rational union represen-
tation election.  Ties to the union are certainly relevant, and it may make 
sense to impose a duty on the employer to make disclosures about any   
potential conflicts of interest between itself and the union.  The company’s 
finances are also relevant, as its financial condition may dictate what level 
of wages and benefits it could provide to employees.  Much of the infor-
mation useful to potential shareholders would also be useful to employees 
contemplating unionization (albeit perhaps for different reasons).  In this 
regard, the Board could piggyback off disclosures made by publicly-traded 
companies to the SEC. The Board could provide a link to the employer’s 
EDGAR disclosures through the election website, just as it would link to 
union disclosures at the website as well. 
                                                                                                                           
 146 See Martin H. Malin & Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The National Labor Relations Act in Cyberspace: 
Union Organizing in Electronic Workplaces, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (2000); Susan S. Robfogel, Electron-
ic Communication and the NLRA: Union Access and Employer Rights, 16 LAB. L.J. 231 (2000); 
Gwynne A. Wilcox, Section 7 Rights of Employees and Union Access to Employees: Cyber Organizing, 
16 LAB. L.J. 253 (2000); Elena N. Broder, Note, (Net)Workers’ Rights: The NLRA and Employee Elec-
tronic Communications, 105 YALE L.J. 1639 (1996); Wissinger, supra note 29, at 347-48. 
 147 See Lofaso, supra note 6, at 41. 
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This system of optional disclosure would have two policy objectives.  
The first would be to increase the availability and accessibility of infor-
mation about the employer to employees.  The second objective would be 
to put a premium on employer participation within the campaign.  As noted 
above, perhaps the primary justification for employer involvement in the 
union campaign is the employer’s role in providing negative information 
about the union to employees.  A system of mandatory union disclosure 
would weaken that justification.  If the regime of disclosure is comprehen-
sive enough, perhaps employers could be ushered completely out of the 
election process, leading to a de jure system of employer neutrality.148  Such 
a system, however, would have to overcome complicated free speech and 
informational concerns.  A system of optional disclosure would put a price 
on participation – a price rationally related to representation election      
regulation. 
C.  Reconfiguring Campaign Regulation 
The Board’s regime of representation election regulation has long been 
criticized for its indeterminate and hair-splitting standards.  Since the Board 
has not been all that concerned with managing the information in the cam-
paign, the proposed system of disclosure would not necessarily affect the 
Board’s prohibitions on coercion, bribery, or inflammatory appeals; such 
regimes could coexist.  At the same time, a new disclosure regime might 
provide an opportunity for the Board to reexamine the current prohibitions 
and adopt a simpler, more streamlined system.  If the union and employer 
are providing critical information to the employees up front, then perhaps 
employees will place less emphasis on the information they learn from the 
participants during the campaign.  However, given the different purposes of 
much of the Board’s regulation, perhaps there need not be any changes to 
the Board’s efforts to regulate speech and conduct that have the tendency to 
coerce employees in the exercise of their choice. 
However, there is one reform that would substantially supplement and 
strengthen the disclosure regime: penalties for misrepresentation and fraud.  
Unlike perhaps every other regime of commercial regulation, the Board’s 
regulation of the union representation election does not penalize for fraud.  
This failure is anathema to the need for employees to trust the information 
they are getting from unions and employers.  Required disclosures would be 
                                                                                                                           
 148 Employer neutrality has many advocates.  See James Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card 
Check Recognition: Prospects for Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819 (2005) (supporting the 
enforceability of employer neutrality agreements); Bodie, Information, supra note 6, at 51-55         
(discussing the skewed incentives of employers to participate in the election campaign); Sachs, supra 
note 141, at 680-91 (discussing the deleterious effects of employer intervention on employee choice).   
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useless if there are no penalties for failures or misrepresentations in those 
disclosures.  The Board should, at the least, treat material misrepresenta-
tions as grounds for overturning an election, and it should treat any error or 
omission in the mandatory disclosure as per se material.  The Board could 
also consider stronger penalties such as monetary damages or injunctive 
relief.  In making a union representation decision, employees should be 
protected against fraud as consumers generally are when making economic 
decisions.149  Fraud should not be tolerated. 
D.  Providing Space for Employee Discourse  
In the 1980s, the SEC saw the opportunity for a new approach to dis-
closure and public access to that disclosure.  In developing the EDGAR 
system, the SEC has changed the ability of shareholders, prospective share-
holders, and the markets as a whole to have easy access to critical infor-
mation.150  The NLRB, on the other hand, has been generally reluctant to 
engage in changes based on new technological possibilities.151  Perhaps 
most (in)famously, the Board has made it very easy for employers to pro-
hibit union email solicitations or other communication while permitting 
employees to engage in virtually every other kind of non-work-related    
exchanges.152  Rather than using the new medium to provide for greater 
access to information and communication, the Board relied on traditional 
property law analysis to shut down a potential avenue of growth. 
Professor Jeffrey Hirsch has been a consistent and thoughtful advocate 
for ways in which the Board can use electronic technologies to improve the 
functioning of the NLRA.153  In a recent paper, Hirsch argues that the Board 
needs to do more to encourage employee discourse.154  Given the difficulties 
inherent in collective action, Hirsch points out that the Board cannot      
assume that providing a limited avenue for communication is sufficient.  
Instead, the Board needs to take steps to encourage employee discourse.  He 
                                                                                                                           
 149 Kent Greenfield has discussed the lack of fraud protection for employees in the context of the 
labor market more generally.  Kent Greenfield, The Unjustified Absence of Federal Fraud Protection in 
the Labor Market, 107 YALE L.J. 715 (1997). 
 150 Don Langevoort, among others, saw the possibilities for EDGAR from its inception.  Donald 
C. Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of Securities Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 
747, 757-58 (1985) (discussing EDGAR’s potential to “reduce investors' dependence on financial inter-
mediaries for the collection and distribution of information”). 
 151 I say this with regard to the Board’s policies in enforcing the Act, not its internal management.   
 152 Guard Publ’g Co. d/b/a The Register-Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1111 (2007), enforcement 
granted in part and denied in part, 571 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 153 See Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Silicon Bullet: Will the Internet Kill the NLRA?, 76 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 262 (2008); Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Taking State Property Rights Out of Federal Labor Law, 47 B.C. L. 
REV. 891 (2006). 
 154 Hirsch, Communication Breakdown, supra note 7. 
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suggests not only striking down employer restrictions on employee com-
munications, but also providing for more structured discourse during     
election campaigns and providing notices to employees about their rights.155  
A disclosure regime would be an important addition to Hirsch’s discourse 
model.  It would provide a baseline of information from which further    
discussion could spring.  As Hirsch points out, “a meaningful right of    
collective action requires employees to have enough information to exercise 
that right.”156  I would encourage the NLRB to look to the example of the 
SEC in matching a system of information disclosure with the technological 
means to make the information easily accessible to those who need it.   
As part of the disclosure websites discussed in Part II(A)(2), the Board 
could also provide for virtual discussion areas for employees to “meet” 
electronically and discuss collective employee issues.  These areas could be 
discussion boards, blogs, or even virtual space in online worlds such as 
Second Life.157  Such electronic meeting places would provide employees 
with a neutral space in which to carry on the discourse necessary to collec-
tive bargaining.  Such spaces could be employees only, or unions and    
employers might have limited access to the space to facilitate the dialogue.  
There is ample evidence that employees are using these spaces already in 
the context of their work life and their personal life.  It would be a natural 
extension for many employees to engage in workplace discourse electroni-
cally.158  Employing technology creatively could give the Board an invigor-
ated role in workplace life in the new century. 
E.  Intended Effects of the New Regime 
In laying out a framework for reform, I wish to conclude by talking 
about the two general goals of these reforms – two effects they should    
endeavor to create.  First, the disclosure regime should highlight many of 
the more egregious conflicts of interest between labor organizations and 
employers.  If ties between the union and company are highlighted for    
employees, employees will be in a much better position to police such ties.  
Second, a more rational and organized system of information regulation 
will help employees make more informed and rational decisions.  And to 
the extent that employees could better trust the information they are getting, 
they may feel more comfortable committing themselves to union      mem-
                                                                                                                           
 155 Id. at 20-62. 
 156 Id. at 52.   
 157 For a discussion of workplace issues in virtual worlds, see Miriam A. Cherry, Working for 
(Virtually) Minimum Wage: Applying the Fair Labor Standards Act in Cyberspace, 60 ALA. L. REV. 
1077 (2009). 
 158 For a discussion of the NLRA in the electronic workplace, see Malin & Perritt, supra note 147. 
644 FIU Law Review [5:617 
 
bership.  Certainly, better information could lead to the result that even 
fewer employees decide to join unions.  But whatever the result, a system 
of disclosure would provide employees with the tools to better evaluate the 
decisions before them.  In the long run, more rational decisions will mean 
more efficient ones, which will ultimately leave society better off.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
The Board, courts, and academic commentators have (with good     
reason) focused on employer coercion and administrative delay as key con-
cerns in the regulation of the union representation election.  However, the 
critical role of information – information necessary to make an efficient 
representation decision – has been neglected.  This paper argues for a new 
approach to representation elections: one that creates disclosure require-
ments for both unions and employers, as well as one that empowers the 
Board to manage the flow of information to employees.  At the least, this 
new approach will help prevent conflicts of interest that despoil the       
relationship between a union and its members.  However, such a process 
may ultimately lead to a newly invigorated market for representation driven 
by a wiser, more informed class of employees. 
 
